IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF SRI LANKA

In the matter of an Application for Special Leave to Appeal to the Supreme Court against Judgment of the Court of Appeal delivered on 04/06/2010 in C. A. Appeal No. 1185/95 (F) D.C. Galle No. 9180/P.

Akmeemana Mahanama Gamage
Therabaya Gunasekara, of Mabotuwana Road, Wanduramba.

Plaintiff

SC Appeal No. 96/2010
CA Appeal No. 1185/95 (F)
DC Galle Case No. 9180/P

Vs.

1. Lokunarangodage David De Silva, of Pallewatte,Wanaduramba

2. Babynona Gunasekara, of Haputantrigewatte, Wanduramba.

3. Akmeemana Gamage Sriyalatha Gunasekara

4. Akmeemana Gamage Sunil Palitha Gunasekara

5. Akmeemana Gamage Gamini Gunasekara

6. Akmeemana Gamage Chandranee Gunasekara

7. Akmeemana Gamage Gnanatilaka Gunasekara

8. Akmeemana Gamage Maithreepala Gunasekara

Defendants

Akmeemana Mahanama Gamage Therabaya Gunasekara, of Mabotuwana Road, Wanduramba.

Plaintiff-Appellant

Vs.

1. Lokunarangodage David De Silva, of Pallewatte, Wanduramba.

2. Babynona Gunasekara, of Haputantrigewatte, Wanduramba. (Deceased)

2A. Akmeemana Gamage Maithreepala Gunasekara

3. Akmeemana Gamage Sriyalatha Gunasekara

4. Akmeemana Gamage Sunil Palitha Gunasekara

5. Akmeemana Gamage Gamini Gunasekara

6. Akmeemana Gamage Chandranee Gunasekara

7. Akmeemana Gamage Gnanatilaka Gunasekara (Deceased)

7A. Akmeemana Gamage Maithreepala Gunasekara

8. Akmeemana Gamage Maithreepala Gunasekara
All of 'Chitral',
Haputantrigewatte,
Wanduramba.

Defendant-Respondents

Akmeemana Mahanama Gamage Therabaya Gunasekara, of Mabotuwana Road, Wanduramba.

Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner

Vs.

1. Lokunarangodage David De Silva, of Pallewatte, Wanduramba.

2. Babynona Gunasekara, of Haputantrigewatte, Wanduramba. (Deceased)

2A. Akmeemana Gamage Maithreepala Gunasekara

3. Akmeemana Gamage Sriyalatha Gunasekara

4. Akmeemana Gamage Sunil Palitha Gunasekara

5. Akmeemana Gamage Gamini Gunasekara

6. Akmeemana Gamage Chandranee Gunasekara

7. Akmeemana Gamage Gnanatilaka Gunasekara (Deceased)

7A. Akmeemana Gamage
Maithreepala Gunasekara

8. Akmeemana Gamage
Maithreepala Gunasekara
All of 'Chitral',
Haputantrigewatte,
Wanduramba.

Defendant-Respondent-Respondents

Before: Buwaneka Aluwihare, PC. J.
Murdu N. B. Fernando, PC. J.
S. Thurairaja, PC. J.

Counsel: Uditha Egalahewa PC with Damitha Karunaratne, Miyuru Egalahewa, Arunodha Jayawardena, Thilini Payagala Bandara for the Plaintiff-Appellant-Appellant.

D. T. T. Dassanayake with W. R. Kaushali Samaratunga for the 2nd to 8th Defendant-Respondent-Respondent.

Argued on: 21. 07. 2020

Decided on: 11 .10. 2023

Judgement

Aluwihare PC. J

(1) The Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner-Appellant sought leave to appeal against the judgement of the Court of Appeal dated 17.06.2010 and this court on 08.09.2010, granted leave on the questions of law referred to in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of paragraph 18 of the Petition of the Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner-Appellant [hereinafter referred to as the 'Plaintiff']. The said questions are reproduced below;

(a) Has the Court of Appeal erred in law in holding that the contesting Defendants have acquired a prescriptive title by possession from the date of the final decree in 1965, because in terms of the last will of Andoris Gunasekera and also in terms of the final decree, from the date of the final decree in 1965 the undivided 471/480 share of Andoris Gunasekera was subject to the life interest of Metaramba Liyanage Rosa who conveyed same by deed 2D1 in 1975 to the 2nd Defendant and she (Rosa) thereafter died only in October 1979:; This action was instituted in 1984, so that, ten years had not lapsed since even the execution of Rosa (and two others) of Deed 2D1 in 1975 and this action was instituted in 1984;

*(b) Did the Court of Appeal err in law in failing to apply the proviso to Section 3 of the Prescription Ordinance(as interpreted in **Lesin V. Karunarathne** 61 NLR 138) to the facts of this case, in that, as a matter of law, during the lifetime of the life interest holder it is not possible for anyone to acquire a prescriptive title to the land as against its owner; as a matter of law, no one could have begun to acquire a prescriptive title as against the Plaintiff until the death of Rosa in 1979;*

The Factual background

(2) The Plaintiff instituted a partition action before the District Court seeking to partition a land called 'Haputantrigewatte' consisting of three contiguous

allotments. The said lands are depicted in the preliminary plan bearing No. 1206 as lots 'A', 'B' and 'C'. The aggregate extent of these three lots is, 2 acres 2 roods and 17 perches. The Plaintiff cited two defendants, namely David Silva [1st Defendant- Respondent-Respondent] and Baby Nona Gunasekera [2nd Defendant]. Subsequently, however, on an application for intervention, 4 other defendants [3rd to 6th] were added on 08th June 1990. On 15th October 1991, the 7th Defendant was also permitted to intervene. The 3rd to the 6th Defendants happened to be the children of the 2nd Defendant whereas the 7th Defendant happened to be the husband of the 2nd Defendant. Finally, the 5th child of the 2nd Defendant was added as the 8th Defendant. The case proceeded to trial on that basis.

(3) The learned District Judge by her judgement dated 26.01.1995, dismissed the Plaint subject to costs. Aggrieved by the said judgement the plaintiff moved the Court of Appeal by way of appeal and the Court of Appeal too dismissed the appeal.

(4) There is no dispute as to the identity of the corpus. To put it in a nutshell, the Plaintiff claimed the corpus on the strength of the Last Will of his father Adonis Gunasekera (also called 'Andoris'), whereas the 2nd to the 7th Defendants moved for dismissal of action based on the ouster by virtue of undisturbed and uninterrupted possession for over ten years.

(5) The learned District Judge held with the Defendants and had come to a finding that the said Defendants have proved ouster and had gained prescriptive title to the corpus and the Court of Appeal upon analysing the evidence held that the learned District Judge had arrived at the correct finding and accordingly dismissed the appeal.

(6) The thrust of the learned President's Counsel's argument on behalf of the Plaintiff was that this is a case where the proviso to Section 3 of the Prescription

Ordinance [hereinafter the 'Ordinance'] ought to have been applied by both the District Court as well as the Court of Appeal. It was argued, however, that both the learned District judge as well as the Court of Appeal erred in not doing so. It was contended by the learned President's Counsel that if the proviso was applied, the Defendants would not have been able to satisfy the court that there was an ouster and that they were in possession of the impugned property for a period of over 10 years, two of the requisites that need to be established to succeed in a claim for prescription.

(7) According to the Plaintiff, his father Adonis Gunasekera [hereinafter referred to as Adonis] was allotted 471/480th share of the corpus under the final decree entered in a partition action bearing No. P/2261 of the District Court of Galle. There was no dispute among the parties of this fact. Adonis died in 1962 and his executor Metaramba Liyanage Elgin was substituted in the room and place of Adonis in the said partition case. The final decree of the District Court was delivered in 1965.

(8) Adonis had executed a Last Will in 1948 [No 1722; marked and produced as 'P2' at the trial] which had been admitted to probate in case No. 8851 of the District Court of Galle. In terms of the said Last Will, the rights of Adonis accrued to his three children namely; (i) Therabhaya Gunasekera [Plaintiff in the instant case] (ii) Harishchandra Gunasekera and (iii) Asoka Gunasekera. The three children of Adonis referred to above, however, got their rights subject to the life interest of their mother Metaramba Liyanage Rosa [herein after referred to as Rosa].

(9) It is also in evidence that one of Adonis' children, Asoka Gunasekera passed away unmarried and issueless and Asoka's interest devolved on their mother Rosa and the two remaining children Therabhaya [Plaintiff] and Harishchandra.

(10) The final decree of the partition action in P/2261 had been marked and produced as 'P1'. It appears that the 2nd to the 7th Defendants were not parties to the said partition action. What is more significant is that no steps had been taken to execute the decree of the said partition action.

(11) In 1975, Rosa along with Elgin and Gnanathilaka Gunasekera executed a deed of transfer No. 31409 which was marked and produced as '2V1', by which the said three persons had transferred whatever rights they had over the corpus, to the 2nd Defendant, Baby Nona Gunasekera. Thus, it appears whatever rights Rosa had over the corpus; she had given them up in 1975. Rosa passed away four years later in 1979.

Evidence of Prescription

(12) For the ease of following the devolution of title, it would be pertinent to place the relationships between the parties in a perspective. It appears that prior to his involvement with Rosa, Adonis was married to one Cecilia De Silva, and sired three children by that marriage. The 7th Defendant, Gnanathilaka Gunasekera happened to be one of those three children. Subsequently Adonis had lived with Rosa, who was his mistress. He states in his Last Will; *"I do hereby direct that my Mistress Metaramba Liyanage Rosa of …shall be entitled to life interest over all my property…"*. Baby Nona Gunasekera [the 2nd Defendant] is the wife of Gnanathilaka Gunasekara, the 7th Defendant. It was to Baby Nona whom Rosa and two others conveyed their rights in 1975 by Deed No. 31409 as referred to earlier.

(13) According to the Plaintiff himself, his stepbrother Gnanathilaka the 7th Defendant and his wife Baby Nona, 2nd Defendant were living in Haputantrigewatte [the corpus] since about 1954. At that time the Plaintiff had been living with his mother Rosa, at No. 80, Halls Road, Galle. In the year 1962, his father Adonis had died. He has said that after the father's death he was not permitted to go to the corpus and that he was abused and chased away by the

7th Defendant. He had also admitted that, after 1954, the Defendants improved the buildings that were standing on the corpus and engaged in cultivation. Subsequently, the children of the 2nd and the 7th defendants had put up houses on the corpus.

(14) The 7th Defendant in his evidence had said that the land in question was given to him by his father [Adonis] even before the decision of the partition action in P/2261 was delivered, and he continued to possess it even after the judgement. According to him, he had requested his father for a block of land, and he was asked to take over the land [corpus] and had been promised a deed in respect of the same. He had been in possession ever since. The 7th Defendant also had said that they mortgaged the property and obtained a loan from the Co-operative Society ['2V3']. He had further said that they had possessed the land for more than 40 years at the point he gave evidence in 1992.

(15) The learned District Judge had acted on the evidence given by the 7th Defendant plus the evidence of the Plaintiff who admitted in the course of his evidence that the 7th Defendant and Baby Nona have been in possession of the land in question since about 1954. Based on this evidence the learned District Judge held that the Defendants had acquired title by prescription.

The application of the proviso to Section 3 of the Prescription Ordinance;

(16) The learned President's Counsel contended that, during the lifetime of the life interest holder it is not possible for anyone to acquire prescriptive title to land, as against the owner. As far as the corpus is concerned, by virtue of the testamentary decree, the Plaintiff and his siblings became the owners of the corpus, however, subject to the life interest of their mother Rosa. The position taken up on behalf of the Plaintiff was, that for the purpose of prescription, the relevant date is either 1975 [the year in which Rosa gave up her rights over the corpus by the execution of the Deed no. 3361] or 1979, the year she died.

It was pointed out that the children of Rosa acquired the right of possession to the property in dispute only after Rosa executed the deed 3361 in 1975 or in the alternative after the death of Rosa [in 1979] who was the life interest holder. The partition action was filed by the Plaintiff in 1984 and therefore the Defendants were short of the required ten-year period of possession to prescribe to the corpus.

(17) In this regard the Plaintiff relied on the decision of **Lesin v. Karunaratne** 61 NLR 138, where Sansoni J. held that under the proviso to Section 3 of the Prescription Ordinance, "*prescription begins to run against parties claiming estates in remainder or reversion* ***only from the time when such parties acquire a right of possession*** *to the property in dispute.*" (Emphasis added). **Lesin** (*supra*), a case with facts similar to that in the instant case was relied upon to explain the above mentioned position; the operation of life interest against the running of prescription. It was observed in Lesin [supra] that, "*The proviso was to be found even in the earlier Prescription Ordinance No. 8 of 1834 and it has been applied in numerous cases. In one of the earliest reported cases (1842 Morg. Diy. 323) the plaintiff and the defendant were children of a deceased proprietor who also left his widow surviving him. The widow had a life interest which only ceased on her death within 10 years of the filing of the action.* ***As the plaintiff acquired the right of possession only on her death, it was held that the defendant could not acquire a prescriptive title against the plaintiff.***" [Emphasis added]

(18) The proviso to Section 3 of the Prescription Ordinance reads thus;
"Provided that the said period of ***ten years shall only begin to run*** *against parties claiming estates in remainder or reversion* ***from the time when the parties so claiming acquired a right of possession*** *to the property in dispute."*
[Emphasis is mine]

(19) As will be made evident in a latter portion of this judgement, the consequence of conveying a property subject to life interest is most peculiar in effect for the purposes of prescription. 'Life Interest' is a unique in that it creates a legal endowment whereby a person who is bestowed such interest is legally entitled to enjoy the property. Therefore, the application of the proviso to Section 3 of the Prescription Ordinance also takes a unique form.

(20) This court is inclined to agree with the learned President's Counsel for the Plaintiff that the proviso to the Section 3 of the Prescription Ordinance, as propounded in **Lesin v. Karaunaratne** (*supra*) should apply to the present case. By the application of the ratio in **Lesin v. Karaunaratne** (*supra*), prescription cannot run during the period in which Rosa enjoyed life interest over the property as against her children. The life interest would have come to a termination upon the death of the life interest holder Rosa in 1979 or in the alternative on the transfer of her rights to the 1st Defendant in 1975 by deed 3361. For the purpose of resolving the question of law, it is immaterial whether we take into account the year 1975 or 1979 as the terminal point of Rosa's life interest. However, as it would be more beneficial from the stand point of the Plaintiff to take the date as 1979, [in which case the proviso to Section 3 of the Ordinance would be applicable for a greater period] and for the ease of explaining the rationale for the conclusions reached in this judgement, the terminal point of Rosa's life interest would be considered as the year 1979, the year in which she died.

(21) In view of the proviso to Section 3 of the Ordinance, by operation of law, the period Rosa enjoyed life interest over the corpus has to be discounted from the period of possession as far as the claim for prescription is concerned. However, there are a number of factors that this court needs to consider in deciding whether the learned District Judge was correct in coming to the finding that the Defendants have established all requisites in Section 3 of the Ordinance to satisfy that they [in particular the 7th Defendant] had acquired prescriptive

rights to the impugned property. In the circumstances it would be relevant to iterate them here;

(a) There is no dispute that the 7th Defendant had come into possession of the property in 1954.

(b) It is also common ground that the 7th Defendant and his family continued to possess the property since then without an interruption, a period of 30 years up to the date of action in the District Court.

(c) It is the position of the 7th Defendant that the land was 'given' to him by his father with the promise of executing a deed which never materialised up to his father's death in 1962.

(d) It is clear from the evidence that the possession that was given to the 7th Defendant was not mere 'permission' to possess but with a declared intention of conveying its ownership to him by Adonis.

(e) It is in evidence that the 7th Defendant possessed the land, developed it, constructed buildings and there was corporeal occupation of the land attendant with manifest to hold and continue it. The fact that the plaintiff was chased away when he attempted to disturb the 7th Defendant's possession after the death of the father, only makes it more certain that he held the corpus adversely to those who disputed his rights.

(22) I am also mindful of the fact that the issues involved in the proof of prescriptive title are mainly questions of fact and in the absence of compelling considerations, sitting in appeal this court should not disturb the findings arrived at by the learned District Judge. Based on the facts referred to in the previous paragraph, we cannot see any flaw in the findings of the learned District judge, save for the application of the proviso to Section 3 of the Ordinance.

(23) This brings us to the question as to whether the non-application of the proviso to Section 3 of the Ordinance to the facts of the instant case has caused

prejudice to the Plaintiff and if so whether it is sufficiently grave to grant relief as prayed for by the Plaintiff. In this regard the only issue that this court is called upon to consider is whether the Defendants have satisfied the requirement of the 'uninterrupted possession' of the corpus for ten years.

(24) It was argued that Rosa died in the year 1979, the point at which the Plaintiff acquired the right to possess the land and the action before the District Court was filed in 1984 and as such the Defendants did not have a ten-year period of possession, thus, their claim for prescription is bound to fail.

(25) To my mind the issue does not appear to be that straightforward. As referred to earlier the Defendants were in possession since 1954. The period that must be discounted by virtue of the proviso to Section 3 of the Ordinance is the period from 1962 [The year in which Adonis died] to 1979 [The year in which Rosa died] for the purpose of considering the period that the Defendants were in possession, in determining whether the Defendants have acquired prescriptive rights.

(26) The main issues that would be required to address by this court is whether;

(a) The period from 1954 to 1962 [7 years] can be 'tacked' onto the period from 1979 to 1984 [6 years] in computing the period the Defendants were in possession for the purpose of prescription.

(b) Whether the application of the proviso to Section 3 of the Ordinance arrests the progress of prescription.

(27) In the case of ***Carolis Appu v. Anagihamy*** **51 NLR 355**, the court held that the period of possession of an intestate person can be "tacked on" to the possession of his heirs for the purpose of computing the period of ten years. Although the ratio in the decision in ***Carolis*** (*supra*) is not directly applicable to the case

before us, the fact remains our courts have recognised in principle the 'tacking on' of time periods. **Balasingham** [*Laws of Ceylon Volume 3, Part 2*] has expressed the view that, *"for the purpose of computing this period of prescription the possession of the deceased person and his executor or heir and of a person and his particular successor whether legatee or purchaser, will be reckoned together".*

(28) If not for the supervening factor of Rosa having life interest, prescriptive rights of the Defendants would have extended as against the Plaintiff without an interruption. Assuming that Adonis had died 9 years and 11 months after the 7th Defendant had enjoyed uninterrupted and undisturbed possession of the property, to argue that the 7th Defendant has to prove that he had the requisite possession for ten years, commencing from the death of Rosa would seem unreasonable.

(29) In the case of ***Casie Chetty v. Perera*** **(1886) 8 S.S.C 31**, dealing with the construction of the Ordinance relating to the phrase "... *ten years previous to the bringing of such action*", Berwick D. J. expressed the view; "*The law is always reasonable, or at least must be worked into reason when possible.*"

(30) The fact remains that the 7th Defendant had exercised uninterrupted possession of the corpus until the date of institution of the action. The life interest vested in Rosa impeded his adverse possession only from the date of such conveyance till Rosa's demise. Therefore, in my view, it would be more appropriate to state that his possession was suspended by operation of law, and not 'interrupted'.

(31) I take this view in consideration of the overall scheme of the Prescription Ordinance and what it appears to have contemplated, as evident in the words of the Ordinance.

(32) Although it may not be directly relevant, a parallel can be drawn to the application of Section 13 of the Ordinance which operates as an exception to Section 3 of the Ordinance. Section 13 operates as a proviso in the case of disabilities such as infancy, idiocy, unsoundness of mind, lunacy and absence beyond seas. The crux of the principle is that as long as such disability continues, possession of such immovable property by any other person shall not be taken as giving that person the rights under the Ordinance.

(33) One important aspect that needs consideration is, what would be the effect of prescription already commenced before the disability arose [as akin to the situation in the present case]. The case referred to in ***Sinnatamby v. Meera Levvai*** **6 NLR 50**, was an action for vindication of various parcels of land by the children of one Naina Mohamadu. Naina Mohamadu was the owner of the property in question under a Fiscal's sale which took place in 1879. The conveyance was obtained in 1882. In 1892 Naina Mohamadu went to India, and apparently never returned. He died there six or seven years before the action was filed, which was in1901. Sometime after his death his children returned to Ceylon in 1902 and proceeded to claim this land. They were met by the defendants, who have apparently been in possession of the land for a long time. The Commissioner has found that the plaintiffs had admitted that the land was in fact in the possession of the defendants independently of, and adversely to, the rights of Naina Mohamadu. The Commissioner, however, had said that, although the title was in the plaintiffs, and although the defendants have had what may be called adverse possession for more than ten years, the period of prescription has been interrupted by the fact that during the earlier part of the defendants' occupation Naina Mohamadu was beyond seas, and that until recently the plaintiffs have been minors, and therefore were protected by the provisions of the Prescription Ordinance (Section 14 of Ordinance No. 22 of 1871 and Section 13 of the Ordinance No. 2 of 1889). The Commissioner thereupon gave judgment for the plaintiffs. Moncrieff A.C.J., observed that the Commissioner had overlooked the principle which

was laid down in the case of ***Sinnatamby v. Vairavy*** **(1 S. C. C. 14)** in which it was held by a Court of three Judges that, where prescription had run and the matter had not been, taken out of the Ordinance by any act or other incident, the objection was not sound that the minority of the heir had defeated the Ordinance. Once the Ordinance had begun to run against a party and that its progress was not arrested by the fact that the child of the party (the plaintiff) was at the time of the death of that party a minor. The decision was given under the Prescription Ordinance No. 8 of 1834, section 10, the terms of which are very much the same as those of section 13 of Ordinance No. 2 of 1889. The Court held in ***Sinnatamby v. Vairavy*** *(supra)*, that they could not read the clause so as to stop the running of prescription already commenced by reason of the disability of a person succeeding to the right of the obligor.

(34) In the case of ***Meera Levavi*** (*supra*) Naina Mohamadu did not leave the country until 1892, and the Ordinance had begun to run against him for some time at all events; and, relying on the principle enunciated in Sinnatamby**,** Moncreiff A.C.J. held that; "*the mere fact that his succession passed to the plaintiffs on his death, and that they were minors at the time, cannot arrest the progress of prescription.*" He went on to observe that "It being admitted, therefore, that the defendants have been in adverse possession for more than ten years, the progress of the Prescription Ordinance has not been arrested by the minority of the plaintiffs, or the absence of their father [Naina Mohamadu] beyond the seas. On the reasoning referred to above Moncreiff A.C.J. held that the Commissioner's decision was wrong and reversed it.

(35) Moreover, in our kindred jurisdiction of South Africa, it is now settled that prescriptive possession previously halted may be 'tagged on' to, and resume when a natural or civil disability disappears or expires, and that absolute continuity is not required to establish uninterrupted possession. ***Wille's Principles of South African Law***, citing **Voet 41.3.17**, states that:

"Traditionally, the course of prescription could be interrupted or suspended. If interrupted, the running of prescription was, subject to certain qualifications, completely halted and had to start de novo. Suspension of prescription, on the other hand, suspended prescription only temporarily and once the suspending circumstance disappeared, the running of prescription was resumed." [page 514]

(36) Considering the statutory provisions and the weight of the judicial authority referred to above, I am of the view that; As far as this case is concerned, the period from 1954 to 1962 [7 years] can be 'tacked' onto the period from 1979 to 1984 [6 years] in computing the period the Defendants were in possession for the purpose of term of prescription and regarding the application of the proviso to Section 3 of the Ordinance the progress of prescription is not arrested subject, however, to discounting the period Rosa enjoyed life interest to the corpus.

(37) As far as the instant case is concerned, I do not think that this court needs to go to the extent of the decisions in either ***Meera Levavi*** (*supra*) or ***Sinnatamby*** (*supra*). The commencement date of the period of prescription was 1954 when Adonis gave the land to the 7th Defendant. By operation of law, the clock stopped ticking as against the Plaintiff in 1962 when Adonis died and Rosa accrued life interest and again time started running from 1979 upon the death of Rosa. The Plaintiff knew very well that the 7th Defendant had resisted when the Plaintiff approached him regarding the land in 1962, hence he had every opportunity to challenge the Defendants' claim soon after the death of Rosa which the Plaintiff failed and when action was eventually filed, even after discounting the period Rosa enjoyed life interest, still the Defendants had enjoyed adverse possession for more than 10 years when the two periods; Prior to Adonis's death and subsequent to Rosa's death are tacked on.

On the reasoning referred to above, both questions of law on which leave was granted are answered in the negative.

Accordingly, the judgements, both of the District Court and the Court of Appeal are affirmed and the appeal is dismissed.

The Defendants would be entitled to costs of this court as well as the courts below.

Appeal dismissed.

Judge of the Supreme Court

Murdu N. B. Fernando, PC. J

Judge of the Supreme Court

S. Thurairaja, PC. J

Judge of the Supreme Court